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SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC COMMITTEE FOR FISHERIES (STECF) 
 
Different Principles for defining selectivity under the future TM regulation (STECF-13-04) 
THIS REPORT WAS REVIEWED DURING THE PLENARY MEETING HELD IN 
BRUSSELS, BELGIUM, 8-12 APRIL 2013 
 
 
 
Background 
 
An integral part of nearly all fisheries management frameworks has been the regulation of technical aspects of 
fishing operations, through so-called technical measures. These define where, when and how a fishing enterprise 
exploits commercial fish resources and interacts with the wider marine ecosystem. 
 
Technical measures have been used extensively in EU fisheries since the adoption of the Common Fisheries 
Policy (CFP) in 1983. Despite the ‘growth’ in technical measures, there is a commonly held belief that technical 
measures as implemented in the EU have failed to deliver the desired level of protection for juveniles and 
reductions in unwanted by-catch. 
 
Recognising this, as part of the on-going reform of the CFP, the Commission has signalled its intention to 
develop a new approach to regulate technical measures based on simplification, adaptation of decision making 
to the Lisbon Treaty, increased regionalisation, greater stakeholder involvement and more industry 
responsibility. This approach will strengthen conservation and resource management through better selectivity 
and better protection of the environment. It is centred on the development of an overarching technical measures 
framework with specific regionalised measures included under multiannual plans. 
 
The purpose of this EWG is to explore the potential of technical measures as a management tool in the context 
of a reformed CFP, taking account of the frequently reported problems with the current technical measures 
contained in EU law. The EWG were tasked to explore the overarching principals of technical measures in the 
context of the current CFP and its ongoing reform. It is not the intention to provide a detailed roadmap of which 
technical measures should be deployed in the future; this will require further work which can only be 
undertaken once further clarity on the content of the final CFP agreed. 
 
 
Request to the STECF 
 
STECF is requested to review the report of the STECF Expert Working Group meeting (EWG 13-01), 
evaluate the findings and make any appropriate comments and recommendations. 
 
 
STECF observations and conclusions 
 
The regulation of technical aspects of fishing operations, through so-called technical measures 
regulations, defines where, when and how a fishing enterprise exploits and interacts with marine 
resources and the wider marine ecosystem. Technical regulations can be loosely grouped into those 
that regulate the design characteristics of the gears that are deployed such as the regulation of mesh 
size; those that regulate the operation of the gear such as setting maximum limits on how long or what 
type of gear can be deployed; those that set spatial and temporal controls such as closed/limited entry 
areas and seasonal closures; and those that define minimum sizes of fish and specify catch 
composition. Technical measures largely aimed to reduce catches of juveniles of commercial and non-
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commercial species, to improve species selectivity, to avoid catches of protected species, to reduce 
discards and minimize the impacts on the environment. 
 
The main objective of the working group was to address the use of technical measures in the context of 
results-based management (RBM). In that context, it is important to note that in the report “technical 
measures” means technical tools such as gear characteristics, restricted areas, size of fish and 
“technical regulations” refers to technical measures prescribed in EU regulations. 
 
In addition to the possible results-based management of the toolbox of technical measures, the EWG 
reviewed the tactical objectives of technical measures. The report highlights that technical measures 
will have an impact on the exploitation pattern which in turn may affect the estimated FMSY and 
associated fishing opportunities. STECF considers that the linkage between selectivity and catch 
should be part of the advice on fishing opportunities. This would have the benefit of giving a 
transparent association between improving selectivity and improved fishing opportunities thereby 
creating a possible incentive to improve selectivity. Thus far such linkages have been absent from 
catch forecasts and technical measures have tended to be treated externally to the setting of fishing 
opportunities.  
 
STECF considers that the EWG 13-01 has appropriately addressed the TOR and STECF endorses the 
report of the expert group. STECF furthermore considers that the report of the EWG 13-01 forms a 
good basis for the Commission to proceed with the development for a proposal for a new regulation on 
technical measures. 
 
 
Predicting Fishing opportunities; consequences of changes in technical measures 
 
STECF considers that in the context of the transition period to the FMSY management objective, the 
link between selectivity and management thresholds should be systematically investigated. Estimating 
FMSY and fishing opportunities according to various management options related to technical 
measures would substantially improve the advice, providing new insights into fisheries management. 
STECF also notes that in cases where changing the selectivity or introducing new technical measure 
will in the long-term, lead to changes in catch or stock biomass, the transition periods should be 
investigated, with particular attention being given to analysing the potential economic consequences of 
such changes in the short-term and possible changes in fishers’ behaviour (shift in areas, target species, 
etc.).  The direct and indirect ecosystem impacts of changing exploitation patterns should also be 
considered.  
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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Under the current CFP it is considered that technical measures should ensure the protection of marine 
biological resources and the balanced exploitation of fishery resources in the interests of fishermen and 
consumers. Inter alia, this should include “reducing the capture of juveniles of marine organisms 
through mesh size and catch composition rules; protecting nursery and spawning areas taking into 
account the specific biological conditions in the various zones concerned; establishing a balance 
between adapting technical conservation measures to the diversity of the fishery; homogeneous rules 
which are easy to apply; and integrating environmental protection requirements with technical 
measures notably in the light of the precautionary principle.  
In 2012 an STECF Expert Working Group was formed to assist in the development of this proposal. 
EWG 12-14 met in October 2012 and explored the potential of technical measures as a management 
tool in the context of the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and also began to investigate 
possible new approaches to regulating technical measures in the context of a reformed CFP 
EWG-12-14 concluded that “In  general  TM  relating  to  gear  selectivity  have  no  clearly  defined  
objective  and,  following  the  EU decision-making process, the measures finally adopted often differ 
from what was initially proposed and tested.  Many measures are adopted just to improve selectivity.  
To continue the work of EWG 12-14 it was decided at the STECF plenary meeting of November 2012 
to form a second EWG, -EWG-13-01-  to look at a number of important issues that were not dealt with 
by EWG 12-14. 
EWG-13-01 was asked to identify “identify tactical objectives that could potentially be achieved using 
technical measures in the context of results based management”. EWG-13-01 noted that technical 
measures offer an objective means to affect several aspects on the interaction between fishing activity 
on exploited marine organisms and the broader marine environment. This includes; affecting the 
distribution of fishing pressure; affecting the impact of fishing on both the physical and ecological 
environment; and providing an objective mechanism of defining fleet management units based on their 
gear type and selectivity.  
In terms of fishing pressure, technical measures can affect both exploitation pattern (EP) i.e. the 
distribution of fishing pressure across the demographic (age) spectrum of a given stock and secondly 
affect the overall exploitation rate through the deployment of species selective gears which avoid the 
capture of specific species in a given gear. Therefore, and in the context of the overarching objectives 
of the new CFP, technical measures can contribute to the attainment of Fmsy objectives through either 
mechanism. Scott and Sampson (2011) note that the exploitation pattern has a significant influence on 
the point estimates of Fmsy for a given exploitation rate and in general a higher exploitation pattern 
results in a higher Fmsy yield. Therefore, technical measures: through adjustments in gear design and 
operation as well as spatial and temporal controls can contribute significantly to changes in 
exploitation pattern and therefore changes in the potential yield that can be removed from a stock due 
to changes in Fmsy exploitation rates.  
To date, gear related technical measures have been viewed by fishermen as means to apply further 
restrictions on their activity by adding further restrictions which result in additional losses in revenue 
through direct (loss of fish) and indirect means (cost of gear replacement) and have tended to be 
partially mitigated through technical innovation. This not only dilutes the intention of the measure, but 
directs the innovative potential of the fishing industry away from the development and deployment of 
fishing techniques that have the potential to improve the yield from the stock towards the maintenance 
of the status quo, sub-optimal harvesting strategy.  
Generally, the effects on fisheries of technical measures alone cannot be disentangled from the effects 
of other management tools implemented simultaneously, such as TACs and fishing effort restrictions. 
There is a lack of clear objectives for most technical measures and simultaneous application of other 
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input and output controls only allows a comparison of the package of measures taken with the 
outcomes observed. In practice, it is not usually possible to quantify the extent that observed outcomes 
are attributable to one or other of the measures in place. Furthermore, the introduction technical 
measures, with the exception of the Long Terms Management Plan for Cod (Regulation (EC) No 
1342/2008) have not resulted additional fishing opportunities for the fleets concerned, but have rather 
been implemented to achieve some undefined objective which has or at least perceived to result in 
some loss of catch and their introduction is done through the risk of punishment rather than benefit. No 
doubt, this has been a key driver in the failure of technical measures to deliver their intended stock 
benefits.  
The ‘new’ CFP aims towards a regionalised approach with a greater participatory structure where 
stakeholders have a greater influence in terms of how the overarching CFP objectives (Fmsy) are 
achieved. Recognising that technical measures can have a significant bearing on the Fmsy yield that can 
be achieved from a given stock, EWG-13-01 considers that it is worth exploring how technical 
measures (gear/spatial/temporal) as drivers for changes in exploitation pattern can be formally 
integrated into multiannual management plans, along with existing measures e.g. TACs, whereby 
positive adjustments in EP could result in increased fishing opportunities. This could potentially be 
achieved by directly linking exploitation pattern and yield through a harvest control rule type 
approach, where the Fmsy is routinely recalculated to consider changes in selection pattern. To date, 
HCR’s simply function as a result of the size of the spawning stock and a fixed fishing mortality rate.  
In the context of technical measures and their influence on the exploitation pattern and therefore 
impact on the estimate of Fmsy, introducing exploitation pattern as a multiplier would have the benefit 
of directly linking the TAC with the selectivity of the fleets exploiting that stock. This would have the 
benefit of giving a transparent association between improving selectivity and improved fishing 
opportunities thereby creating an obvious incentive to improve selectivity. Thus far such linkages have 
been absent from catch forecasts and technical measures have tended to be treated externally to the 
setting of fishing opportunities. Internalising changes in EP in terms of changes in potential yield 
provides a real commodity to incentivise change through a conservation credit approach. Such an 
approach also has the advantage of providing flexibility in how such changes in exploitation pattern 
are achieved and encourages technical and tactical innovation.  
In relation to the application of technical measures in reducing the impacts of fishing on both the 
physical and ecological environment in the future CFP, EWG 13-01 considered the requirements of the 
MSFD and NATURA 2000 and concluded that the following  are relevant  
• recovering and maintaining the conservation status of ‘features of conservation interest’ (foci) and 
species identified under the Birds and Habitats regulations; 
• maintaining biological diversity; 
• maintaining populations of all commercially exploited fish and shellfish within safe biological 
limits; 
• ensuring that all elements of the marine food webs, to the extent that they are known, occur at 
normal abundance and diversity; and 
• recovering and maintaining sea-floor integrity at levels that ensure that the structure and functions 
of the ecosystems are safeguarded and benthic ecosystems, in particular, are not adversely 
affected. 
Concerning the achievement of Good Environmental Status (GES) under the MSFD the majority of 
Member States seem to acknowledge that the reformed CFP is the mechanism for providing a robust 
framework for the sustainable management of marine biological resources and ensuring a level playing 
field in Community waters. The kinds of measures which are most likely to achieve this include 
technical measures that improve gear selectivity, eliminate discards, spatial/temporal restrictions and 
output measures e.g. catch or landings limits. All of these are already in place across our fisheries in 
some shape or format. They have been evaluated by statutory conservation advisors to MS 
governments. 
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Managing fleet units based on homogenous characteristics is an important component of mixed-
fisheries and fleet based management. The movement towards such approaches, where advice is 
focussed at the level of the fleet or fishery rather than the stock, requires the establishment of 
management units (fleets) which can be defined based on homogeneity of vessel and gear 
characteristics. To this end, technical specifications of the gears and mesh sizes used by different fleets 
are commonly used as part of fleet definitions. Technical regulations (mesh size and gear type) by 
default define the fleet ‘bin’ that an individual vessel belongs to at a given time, so the gear 
characteristics in themselves are not management instruments per se, only descriptors. Under the 
current regulatory system, the permissible mesh size is defined by the retained catch composition and 
area of operation. This raises two issues for consideration.  
Firstly, the level of aggregation is a compromise between maintaining some degree of homogenity 
with respects to the stocks/size groups captured and the broader effects on the environment.. The 
second, more fundamental issue relates to the continued use of mesh size to define a specific fleet 
given a more results driven approach  to management may be more effective and appropriate (as 
concluded by EWG 12-14).  If fully effective, one of the consequences of an RBM is that there would 
be no need for technical regulations and this would mean that one of the key fleet (input) descriptors 
would be removed. Therefore, alternative input based metrics would be required for defining fleet 
units or mesh size regulation could simply become  a contributing feature for defining fleet units with 
no specific objective related to the catch.  
 
A switch towards results based approach, away from the current prescriptive technical definitions of 
permissible gears, has often been cited as a preferable approach. Instead of complex legal definitions, 
which are often difficult to regulate and enforce, it may be more appropriate to focus on the result i.e. a 
specified catch profile. In the context of a discard ban or fully documented fisheries, it could be 
foreseen that the need for technical regulations would be minimal as businesses would evolve to 
minimise unsalable catches and focus their exploitation patterns towards catch compositions that are 
economically optimal. However, this is dependent on the assumption that the optimal economic catch 
profile is consistent with the biological or ecological optimum. With regards to the discard ban as the 
basis to ‘de-regulate’ the current approach to technical measures, this is critically dependent on the 
degree of compliance. Failure to acknowledge implementation issues associated with the discard ban is 
likely to result negative unintended consequences due to free-rider effects unless the ban is adequately 
controlled and enforced.    
Replacing technical specifications with catch based targets would allow freedom within the industry to 
choose the most appropriate tools to their business to achieve the specific targets. This has many 
advantages; freedom to select is likely to provide a strong motivational response from the industry and 
will encourage motivation towards the attainment of quantifiable goals. However, such an approach is 
dependent on understanding of the goals at an individual business level and goal setting that is 
achievable. Setting minimum catches of size classes or species could possibly provide understandable 
targets and these could be readily linked to overall stock objectives, e.g. desired exploitation pattern by 
age.  However, given within and between stock dynamics, it is difficult to identify stable and specific 
metrics that are not susceptible to inter annual changes in population(s) structure over time and 
therefore catch based metrics are likely to stock and regionally specific and subject to ongoing 
revaluation. Alternatively, it may be desirable to specify minimum selectivity standards e.g. species 
specific L50 targets, and then to allow freedom for the industry to determine the specific gear 
characteristics required to achieve this. However, this requires industry/science collaboration to 
evaluate alternative means and will ultimately result in the need for a range of permitted gears due to 
control and monitoring requirements.   
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2 INTRODUCTION  
 
An integral part of most fisheries management frameworks has been the regulation of technical aspects 
of fishing operations, through so-called technical measures. These define where, when and how a 
fishing enterprise exploits commercial fish resources and interacts with the wider marine ecosystem. 
Technical measures have been used extensively in EU fisheries since the adoption of the Common 
Fisheries Policy (CFP) in 1983. Despite the ‘growth’ in technical measures, there is a commonly held 
belief that technical measures as implemented in the EU have failed to deliver the desired level of 
protection for juveniles and reductions in unwanted by-catch. 
As part of the discussion of the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP), the shortcomings of 
technical measures have been highlighted. This has led to a political commitment being given by the 
Commission to come forward with a new proposal for technical measures post-reform. In 2012 an 
STECF Expert Working Group was formed to assist in the development of this proposal. EWG 12-14 
met in October 2012 and explored the potential of technical measures as a management tool in the 
context of the reform of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and also began to investigate possible 
new approaches to regulating technical measures in the context of a reformed CFP.  EWG 12-14 
discussed the historic effectiveness of technical measures; considered the future objectives of gear 
based technical measures in relation to overarching management objectives under the CFP and 
environmental legislation; reviewed management approaches for technical measures and how these 
affect uptake and application of selective gears; and explored how technical measures could be 
regionalised within the context of the management strategies considered and how such regionalised 
measures can be evaluated.     
EWG 12-14 identified a number of serious deficiencies in technical measures. Of particular note is that 
in general, technical measures have been introduced without specific objectives making any formal 
evaluation problematic. While no formal, quantitative assessment is possible, given the continued high 
levels of discards associated with many European fisheries, it is apparent that anticipated impacts of 
technical measures have not been fully realised due to inability or unwillingness to deploy as intended 
and control and enforcement difficulties. The measures finally adopted have also often differed from 
what was initially proposed and tested. Many measures are adopted just to improve selectivity but 
without specified goals with which we can assess the degree of improvement. Additionally technical 
measures have tended to be implemented through negative incentives and the prescriptive nature of the 
regulations have also stifled positive technical innovation by the industry i.e. fishermen have used their 
ingenuity to circumvent the regulations rather than develop technical solutions to specific conservation 
problems. It has also been shown that the utility and effectiveness of technical measures is heavily 
dependent on the regulatory framework in which they are deployed and whether the approach 
promotes the use of technical measures through incentives. However, EWG 12-14 concluded that 
despite these deficiencies in controlling exploitation pattern, the use of technical measures does have a 
significant role in terms of conservation benefit (e.g. In the context of reaching Fmsy it may be possible 
to identify target exploitation patterns and to monitor the performance of the fleets/metiers in attaining 
these goals), while technical measures also have an important role in terms of wider ecosystem 
considerations. 
EWG 12-14 also considered a number of significant changes to the management system proposed 
under the reform of the CFP (COM, 2011) which will impact on the future of technical measures. 
These include an obligation to land all catches (discard ban) and a move towards a more regionalised 
approach through multi-annual plans which cover multiple stocks where and when they are exploited 
together. This will result in a significant paradigm shift from current management approaches. Figure 
2.1 shows how in the future policy landscape, technical measures will shift from the current 
paternalistic position (red box) to one where they will be integrated directly into management plans 
and form one of the instruments available to managers to attain sustainable exploitation of marine 
resources. The broad policy objectives e.g Fmsy and ecosystem objectives will be set at European level 
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(DG MARE) and the choice of instruments taken by regional authorities in consultation with 
stakeholders. The purpose of regionalisation in this sense, is twofold: moving away from 
micromanagement at Union level, and ensuring that rules are adapted to the specificities of each 
fishery and sea basin. It is envisaged that this will lead to and promote increased regional cooperation 
in the development of multiannual plans and specific plans for the implementation of the obligation to 
land all catches as well as for environmental policy objectives. This provides a challenge to the 
Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) and managers to identify and apply instruments that are 
consistent with the overall policy objectives whilst maximising the potential yield available and 
avoiding TAC/quota overshoots. These policy shifts will likely lead to increased focus on the use of 
technical measures to attain these policy objectives.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 Technical measures in the context of the proposed reform of the CFP. 
In the past multiannual plans have tended to cover single stocks and focus on defining targets such as 
fishing mortality rates and/or spawning stock biomass, as well as clear time frames to reach these 
quantifiable targets. However, under the reform it is envisaged that the scope of plans such be 
extended to cover multiple stocks where relevant and also to extend to include conservation measures 
and in particular technical measures. In this regard for the first time technical measures have the 
potential for direct linkage with the setting of fishing opportunities. 
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Additionally, issues such as changing consumer i.e. market demands, ownership rights, ecosystem 
objectives and the degree or efficacy of control and monitoring systems are all likely to influence the 
requirements of technical measures and how they are incorporated into the regulatory framework 
(Figure 2.1). The stated desire to adopt a more regionalised approach to the CFP, where broad 
overarching objectives are set at a European level and regionalised bodies are tasked with identifying 
and applying the specific instruments to achieve these will also require shifts in terms of how technical 
measures are evaluated in terms of achieving specific goals e.g. stock specific and multi-species Fmsy 
targets for example.  
In the context of the reform, EWG 12-14 also highlighted that a top-down approach may not be the 
most effective means of introducing technical measures, especially with regard to technical “details”. 
It considered a results based approach with appropriate impact metrics (impact referring to e.g. fishing 
mortality on fished stocks and damage to other ecosystems elements such as seafloor, seabirds) was a 
more appropriate way to address the current deficiencies of technical measures regulations. EWG 12-
14 concluded that under a result based management system, where focus is on the achievement of 
clearly stated results and not on how the fishery is conducted, there will be a limited need to 
implement technical measures via specific regulations. However, there are difficulties with such an 
approach in terms of monitoring and control that may move away from prescriptive regulations but put 
in place an onerous and expensive control and monitoring system in its place. 
To continue the work of EWG 12-14 it was decided at the STECF plenary meeting of November 2012 
to form a second EWG, EWG-13-01, to look at a number of important issues that were not dealt with 
by EWG 12-14.. EWG-13-01 was thus tasked with reviewing the possibilities of a result based 
approach from an operational perspective as well as considering the primary objectives of technical 
measures in such a context. 
 
2.1 Terms of Reference for EWG-13-01 
 
The ToRs are as follows: 
a) Identify tactical objectives that potentially could be achieved using technical measures in the context 
of results-based management. 
b) Identify appropriate metrics to quantify the progress towards the tactical objectives identified in a). 
c) Discuss and identify how impact metrics can be monitored and controlled and how the effectiveness 
of an impact based approach can be evaluated. This should consider required levels of compliance and 
difficulties associated in achieving these levels. 
d) Explore the need for minimum standards (baseline regulations), focusing on specifications of 
technical measures, considering there will be a requirement for a transitional phase from the current 
input based approach towards a full impact based system as well policy objectives not suited to a strict 
output based approach e.g. MFSD, NATURA 2000. 
The terms of reference given to EWG-13-01 are intertwined within the overall management approach 
and therefore it is not possible, nor advisable, to consider them in isolation. Therefore, the structure of 
the report does not necessarily follow the terms of reference in sequence. 
 
2.2 Tactical Objectives of Technical Measures 
Technical measures are part of a suite of input and output instruments which combine to influence both 
the exploitation rate and exploitation pattern with a primary goal of attaining sustainable exploitation 
of commercially exploited stocks and the provision of safeguards for wider ecosystem considerations. 
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As such they offer an objective means of affecting several aspects of the interaction between fishing 
activity on exploited marine organisms and the broader marine environment. This includes: 
(1) ;Affecting the distribution of fishing pressure; 
(2) Affecting the impact of fishing on both the physical and ecological environment; and 
(3) Providing an objective mechanism of defining fleet management units based on their gear type 
and selectivity patterns.  
We deal with these three objectives in the following sections. 
.     
2.1.1. Technical measures as a means of regulating fishing pressure 
In terms of fishing pressure, technical measures can affect both exploitation pattern i.e. the distribution 
of fishing pressure across the demographic (age/length) spectrum of a given stock and the overall 
exploitation rate through the deployment of species selective gears which avoid the capture of specific 
species in a given gear. Scott and Sampson (2011) note that the exploitation pattern has a significant 
influence on the point estimates of Fmsy for a given exploitation rate and in general a higher age-at-
capture (age at 50% selection) results in a higher Fmsy yield (MSY). Exploitation pattern is a composite 
result of a range of factors including the selectivity characteristics of the gears, the harvest ratios by 
different gears, as well as seasonal and spatial distribution of fishing effort relative to the seasonal and 
spatial distribution of the resource. Technical measures through adjustments in gear selectivity, and 
measures that set spatial and temporal controls can contribute significantly to changes in exploitation 
pattern and therefore changes in the potential yield that can be removed from a stock due to changes in 
Fmsy exploitation rates.  
The ‘new’ CFP aims towards a regionalised approach with a greater participatory structure where 
stakeholders have a greater influence in terms of how the overarching CFP objectives (Fmsy) are 
achieved. Recognising that technical measures can have a significant bearing on the Fmsy yield and in 
the context of a regionalised approach, it is likely that the fishing industry in particular will seek the 
exploration of how different measures can contribute to achieving Fmsy and other targets (e.g. under the 
MSFD). In addition, the recently proposed introduction of a discard ban  under the reform of the CFP 
requires a shift of exploitation pattern towards the most valuable target size classes/species if 
businesses are to optimise their economic return associated with their fishing opportunities. In practice, 
as larger fish tend to achieve a higher price this will tend to focus selectivity in such a way as to avoid 
the capture of younger age classes. If there is sufficient faith in control and monitoring of catches e.g. 
through CCTV for example then it may not be necessary to specify the technical characteristics of the 
gears deployed apart from requirements for technical measures to provide protection for non-
commercial species and broader ecosystem (e.g. habitat) objectives. This shift is expected to provide 
benefits, both in terms of mitigating growth overfishing and recruitment overfishing. Multiple studies 
(Beverton & Holt 1957, Froese et al. 2008) have shown that increasing size at first capture towards the 
size where the cohort biomass maximises (Lopt) allows the extraction of higher MSYs at lower levels 
of stock depletion. Recently, Froese et al. (2008) and Colloca et al. (2013) showed that shift in size at 
first capture closer to Lopt can result in higher benefits compared to just reducing fishing mortality. In 
addition, it has been shown that allowing fish to spawn at least once before they are caught also 
promotes fisheries sustainability (Myers & Mertz 1998; Vasilakopoulos et al. 2011). However, the 
above assumes that the optimal exploitation pattern from an economic perspective is consistent with 
that of the optimal biological or ecological exploitation pattern. This may not be the case where 
fisheries target juveniles (e.g. Mediterranean fisheries). There is also some evidence that changes in 
exploitation pattern, resulting in changes in demography, may also induce plastic (e.g. density-
dependent) and evolutionary changes in growth and maturation (Heino and Godø 2002), and thus 
affect sustainability. Additionally the concept of balanced harvesting where the exploitation pattern is 
more consistent with productivity and tends to diminish with age, infers that there may be some degree 
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of conflict between economic and biological/ecological optimums (Law et al, 2012). Many of these 
issues are still open to question both from an ecological and practical perspective. However, if there is 
evidence that the optimised economic selection pattern is at odds with biological/ecological 
consideration, then measures to influence exploitation pattern through the use of technical measures 
may still be required. 
In practice, fisheries are mainly regulated by setting exploitation rate (fishing mortality or harvest rate) 
rather than exploitation pattern (selectivity) targets, which can currently be considered as flanking 
measures. Worm et al. (2009) focused on exploitation rate as the proximal driver of stock status. 
However, exploitation pattern influences MSY and Fmsy (Scott and Sampson 2011) and stock status. 
The effect of exploitation pattern is not considered in the current assessment and advice process, where 
usually a status quo exploitation pattern is (implicitly) assumed. Currently, minimum landing sizes are 
mostly well below size at maturity and Lopt (Froese et al. 2008; Khalilian et al. 2010). In other words, 
current management underutilises the potential of exploitation pattern as a driver, in addition to 
exploitation rate (F), for the achievement of MSY targets. 
Scott and Sampson (2011) show that increasing the mean age-at-capture, assuming an asymptotic 
exploitation pattern curve, results in a higher MSY obtained with different (mostly higher) Fmsy values; 
see figure 2.1.1.1. This finding has been shown to hold for a wide variety of inputted biological 
parameters and a variety of exploitation pattern curve shapes (Vasilakopoulos, in prep.). Another 
metric of exploitation pattern that has been shown to reflect the effects at the stock level is the ratio of 
F on immature over F on mature individuals weighted by abundance (Fimm/Fmat; Vasilakopoulos et al. 
2011). 
 
Figure 2.1.1.1 population-selection curves (left hand panel) assumed for the equilibrium yield versus F relationships shown 
in the right hand panel assuming an asymptotic selection pattern. The arrows indicate the ordering of the series. From Scott 
and Sampson 2011. 
 
To explore the potential of exploitation pattern and exploitation rate combined as drivers for the 
achievement of higher MSY, the short- and long-term effects of increasing age at first capture on the 
dynamics of a simulated exploited ‘cod-like’ population were investigated by EWG 13-01. Two shifts 
in age at 50% selection (A50) were investigated. The age at maturity of the fish was assumed to be 3 
years. The baseline run with A50 = 3 years resulted in an Fmsy = 0.16y-1 which produced an 
MSY=10,300 tonnes. The simulated population was projected forward for 20 years exploited at the 
Fmsy level (0.16) with A50 = 3 years, and then the A50 shifted to an older one, 4 or 5 years respectively, 
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and was then projected for another 20 years. Table 2.1.1.2 presents for each A50: (i) the corresponding 
Fimm/Fmat; (ii) the yield in the first year (STF, Short Term Forecast) after the A50 change under the 
status quo F (0.16); (iii) the recalculated Fmsy for the new exploitation pattern (Figure 2.1.1.2); (iv) the 
yield in the first year after the A50 change under the new Fmsy; (v) the equilibrium yield (after 20 years) 
under the status quo F (0.16) with the new A50; (vi) and the equilibrium yield (after 20 years) under the 
new Fmsy (MSY). In all cases the F referred to is the F of the fully-selected age class. 
 
Figure 2.1.1.2 Equilibrium yield and SSB as a function of F, and MSY and Fmsy, under three scenarios of A50 (see text)  
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(under new Fmsy) 
Current = 3y 1.1.1. 0.37 1.1.2. 10300 1.1.3. (0.16) 1.1.4. 10300 1.1.5. 10300 1.1.6. 10300 
1.1.7. Change 
from 3y 
to 4y 
1.1.8. 0.24 1.1.9.  9300 1.1.10. 0.20 1.1.11. 11000 1.1.12. 10600 1.1.13. 10700 
1.1.14. Change 
from 3y 
to 5y 
1.1.15. 0.15 1.1.16.  8100 1.1.17. 0.24 1.1.18. 11000 1.1.19. 10700 1.1.20. 11100 
Table 2.1.1.1 Results of simulating shifts in A50. 
As expected, an increase in A50 is reflected in the decrease of Fimm/Fmat,, suggesting that Fimm/Fmat is a 
good proxy for capturing the changes of mean-age-at-capture taking place. Table 2.1.1.1 shows that 
the short term effect of increased A50 under status quo F, is a loss of yield but in the long term a gain in 
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yield is seen. If the new (increased) Fmsy is applied immediately, this results in a gain in yield in the 
short as well as the long-term. From an economic viewpoint it is, however, necessary to contrast the 
short term losses with the long term benefits in yield. The relative changes will determine whether 
fishermen will support such a change in exploitation patterns.  
Note that the increased F is likely to be associated with increased effort but it cannot be inferred a 
priori whether this is the case (owing to the fact that the increased A50 may be achieved by a technical 
measure that increases efficiency on older ages). In our simulated stock, the mean lengths at the ages 3 
years, 4 years, and 5 years are respectively 60 cm, 73 cm, and 83 cm. If the shifts in A50 were to be 
effected solely by changes in mesh size this would imply, that for every 3.3 cm increase in A50 a 10 
mm increase in mesh size is needed (unpublished model),  and therefore two simulated shifts in A50 
amounts to increases in mesh size of respectively ~40 mm and ~69 mm. This is of course unrealistic 
but shifts in A50 can also be achieved by other means, e.g. by spatial-temporal shifts in effort allocation 
towards areas and seasons where smaller fish can be avoided. In this preliminary simulation the age at 
maturity is coincident with the initial A50. The positive effects from increasing A50 would likely be 
higher if the baseline A50 would have been below the age at maturity, which is the case in most 
exploited stocks. This example is for illustration purposes only, and stock-by-stock analyses should be 
undertaken to indicate the effects of changes in exploitation pattern on Fmsy and MSY and short-term 
effects on yield. Nonetheless it shows the potential for this type of approach in terms of for increased 
fishing opportunities in reward for positive changes in exploitation patterns. 
The exploitation pattern implemented in these preliminary simulations is asymptotic, whereas the 
overall exploitation pattern for a stock depends not only on the gear configuration but also on the 
spatial and temporal distribution of the fishery and underlying population. These can potentially result 
in complex exploitation patterns. Consequences of the exact shape of the exploitation pattern will 
likely be stock- and area-dependent with single- and multispecies considerations. Evaluation of the 
exact shape of the exploitation pattern requires stock-specific investigation. 
In order to describe exploitation pattern, different metrics will need to be implemented depending on 
the scale of interest. At the gear/vessel level, age/size at first capture (A50/L50) or a relative metric of 
age/size at first capture taking into consideration the age/size at maturity (Am50/Lm50) could be used, e.g 
the difference between A50/L50 and Am50/Lm50 (Vasilakopoulos et al. in prep.). At the fleet level, a 
similar metric could be used, taking into consideration the exploitation pattern resulting from the 
fishing activity from all gears/vessels of the fleet. At the stock level, given the great variety and 
complexity of exploitation pattern curves observed in empirical stocks (Sampson and Scott 2012) it 
could be harder to calculate an objective age/size at first capture. Therefore, at the stock level, the 
Fimm/Fmat metric could be used as a metric of exploitation pattern as it can be calculated over any kind 
of exploitation pattern curve.  
Currently, short-term forecast and fisheries advice are based exclusively on Fbar (exploitation rate); 
adding an F-based metric of exploitation pattern (Fimm/Fmat) in this process could enhance the quality 
and explanatory power of the assessments. Inclusion of such a metric in the stock assessments and 
fisheries advice would also illustrate a greater range of possible exploitation regimes, providing more 
choices to the industry. In any case, as with  exploitation rate metrics such as partial Fs (at the fleet 
level) and Fbar (at the stock level) that are stock-specific, exploitation pattern metrics should also be 
investigated on a stock-by-stock basis.  
EWG-13-01 considers that further exploration is required on how technical measures 
(gear/spatial/temporal) as drivers for changes in exploitation pattern can be formally integrated into 
multiannual management plans, along with existing measures e.g. TACs which aim to control 
exploitation rate is worthwhile. This would involve describing the potential changes in yield associated 
with different exploitation patterns (EP) and Fmsy point estimates and could potentially be achieved 
by a direct link between exploitation pattern and yield through a harvest control rule type approach, 
where the Fmsy is routinely recalculated to consider changes in exploitation pattern.    
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In the context of technical measures and their influence on the exploitation pattern and impact on Fmsy 
point estimates, including exploitation pattern as a ‘yield-multiplier’ would have the benefit of directly 
linking fishing opportunities with the selectivity of the fleets exploiting that stock thereby offering 
quantifiable advantages of improving exploitation  pattern . Thus far such linkages have been absent 
from catch forecasts and technical measures have tended to be treated externally to the setting of 
fishing opportunities. Internalising changes in EP in terms of changes in potential yield provides a real 
commodity to incentivise change such as has been achieved through the conservation credit approach 
developed in the UK (see section 2.1.8 of this report). However, such an approach is not without limits 
and disadvantages. Further exploration on a stock by stock basis is required to assess what the 
potential increases in yield could be in practice and what changes in exploitation pattern are required. 
The initial simulation presented here would indicate that if mesh size alone is used to adjust the 
exploitation pattern, then the increases are substantive and in a mixed-fisheries perspective, may not 
offer an acceptable solution. Additionally, the exploitation pattern at a stock level is comprised of 
multiple and varying contributions across fleets/metiers and different MS engaged in the fishery, some 
of which will have comparatively low or high EP’s. Metiers will have different abilities/desires to 
change their exploitation pattern, and given that the principle of relative stability embedded in the 
allocation of fishing opportunities in EU fisheries is likely to remain fixed, rewarding/penalising those 
MS which contribute the most/least to a positive EP will probably not be possible without impacting 
on relative stability. Therefore incentivising fleets/metiers may only be possible at a MS level. 
Notwithstanding this, one would hope that in the context of regionalisation, bodies responsible for 
fisheries management at this level would work collectively to enhance the exploitation pattern as all 
MS could gain through a proportional increase in fishing opportunities if they operated in an optimised 
way  
 
While the concept of internalising technical measures with other management instruments by linking 
directly with available fishing opportunities has obvious benefits, the concept has limited use in areas 
where there are no catch allocations, where different components of the stock demographics (e.g. 
juveniles and adults) are targeted or where the jurisdiction over a stock is only partial e.g. high seas 
fisheries.  In the Mediterranean, fisheries are regulated by effort control combined with technical 
measures (selectivity of gears, protected areas, seasonal fishing bans, minimum legal size in landings 
for some stocks, etc). No quotas are allocated by country or by fishing techniques except for some 
particular stocks (e.g. highly migratory species regulated by ICCAT) as well as national quotas for 
bivalve molluscs. Measures taken are designed to reduce fishing effort and to avoid the capture of 
juveniles. However, the high frequency of mixed fisheries, the small numbers of adults of many target 
species and the high market demand for juveniles of commercial species that may reach larger sizes 
historically condition the selectivity capability of the gears used.   
The diversity of gears in use, the high development of small-scale fisheries, the presence of many ports 
and landing sites spread along the coasts and the existence of mixed fisheries with not well defined 
target species, make it difficult to assess both the current stock status and the likely consequences on 
the stock size and yields of changes in fishing mortality. Also difficulties exist in mapping the 
available amount of catches of stocks shared with non-EU countries fleets. However, new rules 
imposed in the General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean (GFCM) that encourage data sharing 
and other multilateral cooperation to promote the development, conservation, rational management and 
better utilisation of living marine resources in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea have improved the 
situation. In recent years, catch data for some stocks shared by EU and non-EU countries are available 
and some assessments are now performed. In addition the STECF EWG on the Mediterranean, stock 
assessments are regularly performed per Area divisions (Geographic Sub-areas), but are limited to only 
some important stocks. F-based Reference points (F0.1, Fmsy) are regularly defined. This EWG also 
carries out analysis of management scenarios and harvest forecasting assuming changes in exploitation 
rate. Estimates of variations in yield derived from management options based on changes in 
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exploitation patterns have been derived for some stocks. These analyses, however, are only feasible for 
stocks for which F-at-age by métier information is available. The analyses can be considered 
extremely useful despite the fact that the results cannot be translated into the allocation of fishing 
opportunities (i.e. quotas). The metrics for measuring performance of the implemented measures can 
be the same or similar to those potentially useful for managed stocks: changes in biomass or in total 
catch, F at age, demographic structure (whenever some Reference structure can be defined as 
desirable), fraction of adults in the stock or in the catch but as occurs in the case of stocks that are 
managed through quotas, it is in many cases very difficult to disentangle the relative influence on the 
results of management measures based on EP to those based on ER. 
It is also important to note that many stocks in the Mediterranean are considered in a growth 
overfishing status, with high exploitation rates and an extremely small size of first capture. Aiming at 
an improvement of the exploitation pattern, in recent years the EU and GFCM imposed a very 
moderate increase cod-end mesh size for all demersal trawls, with the expectation of improvements in 
selectivity for many commercial species. Simulations of changes in EP can be more complex, because 
sometimes they deal with not only the selection ability of the gear, but also on alternative ways to 
determine the exploitation pattern (i.e. through a major pressure in certain areas where individuals of 
certain sizes are more concentrated, through seasonal changes in frequency of use of certain gears or 
areas targeting certain stock). The Mediterranean fisheries are very dynamic and adaptive. Difficulties 
for the performance of reliable simulations can be linked to the unpredictable reactions of fishermen 
from the enforcement of new technical measures. Such reactions can be expressed as changes in the 
frequency of use of gears or in the spatial/temporal distribution of fishing effort. 
 
2.1.2. Technical measures in the context of ecosystem objectives  
EWG 12-14 concluded that technical measures have an important role in terms of wider ecosystem 
considerations. These include limiting fishing impacts on low productivity species caught in mixed 
species fisheries; incidental catches of protected species (e.g. marine mammals and seabirds) and 
protection of sensitive habitats. Increasingly, sensitive areas are being closed to certain gear types. 
Technical adaptations to gears can help minimise habitat impacts. It is likely however that area/gear 
restrictions and closures will remain the central approach to protecting habitats and vulnerable 
epifauna.  
In relation to the application of technical measures in the future CFP, EWG 13-01 considered the 
requirements of the MSFD and NATURA 2000 and concluded that the following are relevant  
• recovering and maintaining the conservation status of ‘features of conservation interest’ (foci) and 
species identified under the Birds and Habitats regulations; 
• maintaining biological diversity; 
• maintaining populations of all commercially exploited fish and shellfish within safe biological 
limits; 
• ensuring that all elements of the marine food webs, to the extent that they are known, occur at 
normal abundance and diversity 
• recovering and maintaining sea-floor integrity at levels that ensure that the structure and functions 
of the ecosystems are safeguarded and benthic ecosystems, in particular, are not adversely 
affected. 
Concerning the achievement of Good Environmental Status (GES) under the MSFD the majority of 
Member States seem to acknowledge that the reformed CFP is the mechanism for providing a robust 
framework for the sustainable management of marine biological resources and ensuring a level playing 
field in Community waters. The kinds of measures which are most likely to achieve this include 
technical measures that improve gear selectivity, eliminate discards, spatial/temporal restrictions and 
output measures e.g. catch or landings limits. All of these are already in place across our fisheries in 
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some shape or format. They have been evaluated by statutory conservation advisors to MS 
governments . 
Specific requirements of the descriptors contained in the MSFD are expressed in terms of indicators of 
GES. It appears that the indicators for Descriptor 1, maintaining biological biodiversity, will be 
delivered by following the OSPAR guidance on the required proportions and levels of given habitats 
and species. MS’s are starting to incorporate these into national legislation by the designation of 
marine protected areas that are spatially defined and where anthropogenic impacts are managed in 
appropriate ways.  
Descriptor 3 requires that populations of all commercially exploited fish and shellfish are within safe 
biological limits. The indicators associated with this relate to fishing mortality levels (F), 
catch:biomass indicators, SSB levels/biomass indices, population age and size distribution and age at 
first maturity.  
Descriptor 4 requires that all elements of the marine food webs, to the extent that they are known, 
occur at normal abundance and diversity and levels capable of ensuring the long-term abundance of 
the species and the retention of their full reproductive capacity. Only some of these elements/species 
fall within the scope of fisheries management and hence the ToRs of this EWG: 
• production per unit biomass of key commercial species 
• short-lived pelagic species 
• groups/species targeted by human activities and 
• top predators 
where they are distributed within Community waters, can all be managed by the metrics in section 
2.1.5 of this report. 
Additionally to determine whether this is an appropriate way to flag potential bycatch issues of 
sensitive species and thereby guide decisions as to where monitoring is required, ICES has looked at 
several approaches that may be relevant for future management of such species. Integral to this is 
looking at the amount of  bycatch against some predefined acceptable There are a number of ways to 
generate the acceptable limits and these include the Potential Biological Removal Rate (PBR) or Catch 
Limit Algorithm (CLA) for example.  
Descriptor 6 relates to sea-floor integrity and safeguarding the structure and functions of benthic 
ecosystems. It is widely recognised the seabed is vulnerable to disturbance and modification by fishing 
activities and that the degree of vulnerability is related both to the sensitivity of the seabed and the 
types of impacts resulted from different types of fishing gear. Many years of research have resulted in 
matrices that describe the possible combinations and the management options for mitigating them 
(refs). Inevitably these are predominantly spatial and temporal management, based on the sorts of 
measures described in relation to Descriptor 1 above. 
In conclusion metrics associated with results-based management are only relevant to Descriptors 3 and 
4: the indicators relating to Descriptors 1 and 6 will mainly be delivered by the presence or absence of 
particular fishing operations in given areas. The other potent tool for effort management is the new 
generation of high resolution VMS systems that can help to maintain the production of seafood whilst 
respecting the conservation imperatives that drive marine environmental management. 
 
2.1.3. Technical measures for defining management units 
Managing fleet units based on homogenous characteristics is an important component of mixed-
fisheries and fleet based management. Hilborn (2007) noted that understanding fishermen’s behaviour 
through the aggregated behaviour of fishing fleets is a key ingredient to successful fisheries 
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management. The movement towards such approaches, where advice is focussed at the level of the 
fleet or fishery rather than the stock, requires the establishment of management units (fleets) which can 
be defined based on homogeneity of vessel and gear characteristics. To this end, technical 
specifications of the gears and mesh sizes used by different fleets are commonly used as part of fleet 
definitions. Technical regulations (mesh size and gear type) by default define the fleet ‘bin’ that an 
individual vessel belongs to at a given time, so the gear characteristics in themselves are not 
management instruments per se, only descriptors. For instance, under the current regulatory system, 
the permissible mesh size is defined by the retained catch composition and area of operation while 
under the LTMP for cod (Regulation (EC) 1342/2008) demonstrates how technical specifications of 
the gears (gear type and mesh size) have been applied to define fleet management units e.g. TR1, BT2 
etc, etc. This raises two issues for consideration.  
Firstly, the level of aggregation is a compromise between maintaining some degree of homogeneity 
with respects to the stocks/size groups captured and the broader effects on the environment. In an 
evaluation of the TR1 grouping (>100mm), STECF (PLEN 11-03) noted that the degree of 
homogeneity varied considerably across management areas and the decision to broaden the existing 
gear groupings was really a question of administrative burden. However, STECF (PLEN 11-03) also 
noted that if there are preferential fishing opportunities in one gear grouping over another, then this 
could incentivise movements across gear grouping that could have unintended consequences. 
Nonetheless, given the move towards mixed-fisheries management approaches, it is likely that gear 
categorisation and potentially, the selective characteristics of the gears, will remain an important 
descriptor for defining management units.   
For the purposes of stratifying sampling programmes, the Data Collection Framework Regulation (EC) 
199/2008) uses level 6 criteria which encompasses gear type (Level 4), mesh size (including any 
selectivity device in use; Level 6) as well as nationality, vessel size and spatial-temporal area fished. 
Given the broad spectrum of metiers and fleets operating across the European EEZ, it is unlikely that 
management units which have a reasonable degree of homogeneity in catch profiles and broader 
ecosystem impacts could be found that are able to reconcile catch profile/impacts with any degree of 
cost efficient management burden. For example, Davie and Lordan (2011) identified 33 different 
metiers associated with the Irish otter trawl fleet, such a level of resolution is not practical from either 
a management or sampling perspective and need to be collapsed at some level if they are to offer 
tractable management units. The degree of aggregation is something that needs to be decided at a 
broad management and stakeholder level where there is a trade-off between the desire to have 
management units that are homogenous in terms of catch and impact against the administrative burden 
of management. It is likely that this will be case specific. For example, where there are few metiers 
and target species, a high level of resolution may be possible at an individual MS level and vice versa.  
The second, more fundamental issue relates to the continued use of mesh size to define a specific fleet. 
EWG 12-14 identified a wide range of issues associated with a prescriptive approach to technical 
regulations and in the following sections of this report, we consider how a more results driven 
approach may be more effective and appropriate. If fully effective, one of the consequences of an 
RBM is that there would be no need for technical regulations and this would mean that one of the key 
fleet (input) descriptors would be removed. Therefore, alternative input based metrics would be 
required for defining fleet units or, mesh size regulations could simply become contributing features 
for defining fleet units with no specific objective related to the catch.  
In developing a new technical measures regulation this issue needs to be considered otherwise we run 
the risk of having indefinable fleet units making management difficult. 
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2.3 Technical Measures and a Results based approach 
 
2.1.4. Strategic elements and incentive structures in RBM systems 
In the EWG 12-20 report STECF highlighted the following strategic elements of adopting a results-
based approach in the future development of technical measures:  
(1) Output control versus input control, creates an incentive to develop technology 
supporting the achievement of agreed aims resulting in acceptable levels of negative 
impacts. 
(2) Burden of proof is shifted from managers to the industry.  
(3) Enforcement is based more on the concept of commitment than compliance, and the 
monitoring of enforcement includes elements from peer pressure. 
(4) The management approach and the incentive structure can have a significant impact on 
the effectiveness of technical measures.  
(5) Positive incentives with rewards for doing certain things may work better than 
penalties.  
EWG 12-20 reported on the general concept of incentives and the special situation in respect of 
technical measures. It is clear that regulations which create incentives to reach management targets can 
be more robust and hopefully successful by ensuring that those who have the greatest impact on 
fisheries have an increased interest in the success of the regulations (e.g. higher yields in the future if 
they now bear the costs of overexploitation). However, in complex management environments like 
fisheries it could be a challenge to achieve this.  
The current technical measures lack clear policy objectives, resulting in very detailed technical 
regulations with few incentives to comply, minor success in achieving objectives and limited 
flexibility in the management system. Fishermen have also a very short term security on revenues and 
suffer from the introduction of technical measures due to an increase in costs of operation. 
Additionally, in some cases regulations are contradictory and, therefore, it is unclear which direction 
fishermen have to follow. The main problem for fishermen is the loss of revenues (at least in the short 
term) when new measures are introduced. Therefore, this is a clear negative incentive as with unclear 
objectives and targets, the introduction of detailed technical regulations increase costs without any 
security of at least long term gains.  
Results-based management (RBM) can be defined in fisheries as management by objectives and 
targets where fishermen enjoy a maximum freedom to choose and developed technology and methods 
to optimise results that meet these objectives and targets. RBM ensures incentives for the fishermen to 
steadily improve results and it produces knowledge relevant for gradual development of targets. In a 
results-based management scenario, the objectives and standards need to be agreed at a political level. 
Control and enforcement holds the results-based activities up for scrutiny. This is a different type of 
approach compared to the current control and enforcement activities within the CFP that is largely 
driven by top-down management regulations. In a pure results-based scenario, the fishing industry 
would be responsible for monitoring and control their activities as part of their license to operate. Of 
course this would need to be matched up with appropriate freedom to act as responsible operators (and 
so without too many restrictions on how they achieve their targets). However, this assumes that all the 
actors are behaving in a responsible way to achieve the policy objectives. Without adequate 
independent monitoring at the level of an individual business, it could result in ‘free-rider’ problems. 
In the absence of appropriate monitoring, some business may choose to adopt measures to minimise 
unwanted catches, which could result in short term losses. Other ‘free-riders’ (those who don’t change 
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behaviour) may then benefit without paying for the cost. If there are sufficient ‘free-riders’, then no 
benefit is accrued and the individuals who have acted in a responsible manner are effectively penalised 
twice.   
The introduction of a RBM system would change the actual, negative incentive structure to a more 
positive, proactive structure which gives the fishermen a reward for reaching management targets. This 
incentive structure includes clearer policy objectives (e.g. MSY and the elimination of discards) with 
targets or goals which clearly follow from the objectives (e.g. Fmsy, minimum conservation reference 
size). Having such clearly defined targets would also help (would be necessary) in hind cast 
evaluations undertaken to assess the effectiveness of the actions undertaken by fishermen in achieving 
the policy objectives. In many cases multiple measures may be chosen by the industry to achieve a 
target and fishermen may be free to choose between different ones or develop their own. This freedom 
to choose may give them incentives for technical innovations to lower the costs of implementation and 
from the perspective of an individual business, freedom can be considered a significant asset. There 
are already positive examples with the introduction in the cod plan resulting in the introduction of the 
Scottish conservation credit scheme. Under this scheme there have been numerous examples of such 
technical innovations as fishermen have strived to develop innovative gears to minimise cod catches. 
Linking incentives to outcomes is difficult enough when managing single species, with the relatively 
simple problems of limited exploitation and localised effects. It is even more complicated for entire 
ecosystems, where exploitation is interconnected with system-wide ecological and economic effects 
(Hanna, 1998). However, with a flexible, adaptive management approach it should be possible to 
define targets in an ecosystem context (see approach of the MSFD).  
Figure 2.3 shows the structure of a RBM system and includes responsibilities of the fishing sector and 
the Scientific Community. In addition the results of the assessment of success must lead to action by 
the EU or member states if the targets are not achieved.  
Policy Objective (e.g. sustainable exploitation of stocks, preserving
ecosystemservices, economic and social sustainability)
Target (e.g. 200 mm Minimum Conservation Size of Fish) 
Fishing Sector (selection of
solution to reach target
Advisory Bodies, Scientific 
Community
Research on Technical Solution
to reach targets (together with
Fishing sector)
Assessing of impacts of these
technical solution on the sector
Assess success of
Solutions
Results based management approach
Common understanding
Regional approach
Joint discussions and
agreement (not simply
top down)
 
Figure 2.3 The structure of a RBM system and the responsibilities of the fishing sector and the Scientific Community 
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In practice there are a number of considerations, advantages and disadvantages to the implementation 
of a Results Based Approach as a means of replacing the current prescriptive based approach. These 
can be loosely broken down into:  
• Choice of appropriate metrics and can these be used to gauge progress (or the ‘result’) and 
are how they are linked to the policy goal;  
• Administrative, monitoring and control considerations - processes required to change from 
a prescriptive (technical definitions) approach and where the responsibility of proof lies in 
an RBM approach.  
• Industrial considerations and responsibility – does an RBM offer a ‘better’ approach; do 
the industry understand/agree with the choice of metrics; do they require additional 
technical support to achieve desired outcomes; is there an improvement or violation of the 
concept of a ‘level playing field’?   
 
2.1.5. Selection of appropriate metrics in an RBM system 
EWG-12-14 identified some examples of bad legislative practice where the technical specifications in 
the regulation which are unduly complex (e.g. including legal text on how to repair meshes in a 
Bacoma panel)., while the current objective of technical measures of minimising the capture of 
juveniles and other unwanted organisms does not offer specific, quantifiable goals. The lack of specific 
targets in the current approach to technical measures regulations therefore does not support the 
implementation of RBM, so in the first instance, to implement an RBM system would require the 
identification of appropriate metrics. Under a RBM approach it is necessary that the metrics can be 
clearly linked to the specific policy objectives and that they are agreeable and achievable. In the 
context of technical measures, RBM has benefits in that metrics are more directly linked to the 
objective of manipulating catch patterns to meet management objectives i.e. minimisation of unwanted 
catch. In contrast, compliance with regulations detailing the configuration of fishing gear being used 
does not directly link to delivering of target catch profiles. Therefore, successful implementation, 
provided the correct metrics are chosen, is more likely to deliver stock benefits and management 
objectives. However, there are a number of considerations when selecting appropriate metrics. 
Fitzpatrick et al, (2011) considered the RBM approach and the challenges surrounding the issue of 
burden of proof. In terms of monitoring the efficacy of the RBM approach, the authors note that 
responses can be measured in situ (on the vessel) or ex situ (at the stock or ecosystem level). Ex situ 
metrics are useful in terms of whether the overall objectives are being met for example low fishing 
mortality rates on a particular age group, or other broad measures of ‘sustainability’. Using an RBM 
approach as an alternative to prescriptive technical regulations will require appropriate in situ 
measures in order to demonstrate that individual business are operating within particular and pre-
agreed (e.g. catch profiles) boundaries otherwise there is a significant ‘free-rider’ risk (see above). In 
situ metrics are preferable because they give direct measurements, although they can be invasive and 
costly. Ex situ results are only observable on scales that make it difficult to attribute them to specific 
management measures, or they may be influenced by external factors.   
The metrics selected for a catch-RBM approach need to reflect the management objectives, for 
example a desired catch profile would be represented by some output target. This could include 
defining a minimum size of fish that could be selected and would represent the catch profile. 
Conservation Reference Sizes, as mentioned in the CFP reforms, offer such a potential metric to 
develop a catch-RBM approach. These are proposed as a replacement for the current legal Minimum 
Landing Sizes under the proposed landing obligation. Exactly what the CRSs are, and how they will be 
set has not yet been agreed in the CFP reform process but it is clear that the format of CRSs should be 
based on what it is they are meant to achieve. If they are to be used to deliver a catch-RBM approach 
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then they need to be set with this in mind. Using such a metric, the catch would be split into fish above 
and below this size and the proportion or amount of the catch below this size would be the output 
result. A limit on the contribution of fish under this size would make up the control element of this 
results based approach. The format of the output could be in numbers or weights and set as a 
proportion or percentage of the catch. The size selected could be based on examination of F-at-age 
information for assessed stocks, to determine which size would be most likely to deliver the desired 
catch profile. 
Implementation of this system, however, might lead to an incentive towards non compliance with the 
objectives of the obligation to land all catches. A limit on catch percentage of small fish may result in 
unintended negative consequences that counteract the intentions behind the obligations to land all 
catches. In accordance with the landing obligation a fisherman must land everything, but specimens 
smaller than CRS cannot be sold for human consumption. There is thus an economic incentive to avoid 
catches below CRS.  A limit on catches below CRS would not just dis-incentivise but in addition 
penalise catches of small fish and thus create strong incentives to avoid detection. In a control regime 
without full documentation there is a high risk that this will result in discarding of catch below CRS, 
which will not be landed and counted against the quota in accordance with the landing obligation. 
With the introduction of (hard) sanctions for failure to meet the output targets the incentive framework 
of Catch-RBM increases the risk of non-compliance with a ban on discards. This is the main weakness 
of a results based approach based on catch patterns in the context of European fisheries. 
When considering limits on the catches of specific species, it would also be possible to have multi-
species catch profiles based on the outputs of mixed fisheries modelling, however given the underlying 
assumptions of fixed catchability and activity, this is unlikely to offer the level of precision required to 
operate this at an individual vessel level. Proportions-at-age and at-length as output results could also 
be considered, although these would provide an output result matching more closely the target catch 
profile, making it impractical to impose a higher resolution selectivity target at a vessel level.  
As the stocks of the included species change relative to one another, however,  the desired catch 
profile and, therefore the selected size, would need to be adjusted and it is questionable given the other 
sources in variability, how realistic setting targets based on (ever changing) percentages relative to the 
overall catch could be done in practice. STECF (PLEN 02-11) note that the use of percentage targets 
as part of the long term management plan for cod can induce unintended negative incentives and that 
setting percentage limits based on length or species catch compositions is not appropriate. For 
example, setting a species specific catch limit based on the percentage of the overall catch could 
incentivise fishermen to decrease selectivity on other species which would allow for higher catches of 
the restricted species while maintaining their overall percentage contribution to the catch.  
Related to this issue is the need to identify a number of catch profiles that would describe different 
components of the fleet, which, in combination, will deliver the stock level target catch profile. So 
decisions would be required on how the various fleet components would contribute to the overall catch 
profile. Moreover, for those fisheries that are not fully documented, assumptions on the 
representativeness of catch profiles would be required in order to aggregate vessels into different fleet 
segments.  
Recruitment pulses will also cause problems in fisheries that are for the most part complying with the 
system.  Influxes of sporadic recruitment pulses decrease the probability of fishermen achieving their 
targets despite the fact that they may have been compliant earlier.  In certain fisheries fishermen can 
adjust to this by incorporating various technical measures and using their knowledge to comply with 
the percentages. This would imply a degree of gear complexity in the measures that would be difficult 
to devise and implement. SGMOS(08-01) showed how population structure (length) can affect the 
perception of the effectiveness of an improvement in selectivity if the percentage of fish below a given 
length is used as a metric. It is noted that even with a substantive improvement in selectivity, which 
results in comparatively high reductions in the retention of small fish, when comparing ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
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gears, it is noted that if fished on a population which comprises of few ‘large’ fish, the percentage of 
undersize fish retained relative to the overall catch is only marginally lower with the more selective 
‘new’ gear.  
Apart from recruitment variability, catch profiles vary due to a number of controllable and 
uncontrollable reasons for which there may or may not be strategic solutions.  It could be possible to 
include flexibility into the output result, i.e. the percentage contribution of fish below the defined size, 
based on factors external to the control of the industry (e.g. recruitment pulses). The benefit of this 
would be in enabling adjustment to large pulses in recruitment. A static output result would not 
account for large numbers of fish recruiting to, or moving into, a fishery; effectively, a higher 
proportion of fish would have to be avoided to stay within the amount of small fish allowed. However, 
by adjusting upwards the percentage contribution of small fish, the same selectivity profile could be 
delivered and the fishers would not be disadvantaged. This adjustment could be based on the changes 
in population structure identified in the surveys, and an annual population structure would be defined 
to calculate the output result that will deliver the target catch profile implying that there would be a 
need for periodic re-evaluation of the targets. 
In practice, given the continued changes in population levels and structure within and between species, 
the use of catch based metrics as a means of target setting (for the industry) and to attain specific stock 
(policy) objectives, is likely to require continued re-evaluation of targets to take into consideration the 
changes in populations over time. While in principle, a switch towards a results based system where a 
catch demographic is used could greatly simply technical regulations, the choice of catch metric needs 
careful consideration with regard to changes in populations. 
As an alternative to a catch based metric, it may be possible to identify a minimum selectivity 
requirement (selectivity profile) or baseline gear and leave the technical design features to the industry 
to develop, the concept being that the industry could develop gears that will have the same selectivity 
profile. This will require cooperation between industry and gear scientists to evaluate gear 
equivalence. This type of approach has been followed in developing a new package of technical 
measures for fisheries in the Skagerrak whereby a baseline codend minimum mesh size at 120mm in 
demersal trawls and seines. The advantage of this approach over a catch based metric would be that the 
target selectivity would not require ongoing adjustment to account for changes in the underlying 
population(s). However, it is likely that this type of approach would lead towards a list of approved 
gears simply due to control and enforcement issues, but as show in the example given in section 2.1.9, 
this does not necessarily require an excessive administrative and legal burden. 
While this approach suited the fisheries in the Skagerrak which are relatively simple, the EWG 
concluded that as a general approach across sea basins it would be difficult to implement given the 
diversity and complexity of fisheries. It would be problematic to define single reference gears and 
undoubtedly in the course of negotiating a new regulation MS would seek multiple gear options with 
the result that the final regulation would end up similar to the current situation with multiple mesh size 
regulations. However, it may be useful as a tool at a regional level as part of a multiannual or discard 
plan as insurance that conservation objectives are still being met. In the context of alternative gears, it 
would also be important to consider the potential differences in escape survival. If a particular gear or 
species results in elevated escape mortality in comparison to the minimum standard, then the 
overarching stock benefits may not be realised in practice. How this could be demonstrated is 
problematic given the resources required for survival studies.  
 
2.1.6. Administrative, monitoring and control considerations 
The RBM approach is considered to be less bureaucratic requiring fewer regulations relative to the 
current suite of technical measures which is characterised by a growing number of increasingly 
detailed regulations that are difficult to interpret for controllers and fishermen alike. Additionally, 
setting specific catch limits or thresholds offers the opportunity to incorporate a (coercive) incentive, 
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whereby sanctions would be imposed if target levels of undersized catches were exceed. For example 
the requirement to change areas, limitation on fishing opportunities or fines linked to the catch 
composition (the objective) rather than the technical specification of the gear. The sanctions for non-
compliance would therefore internalise the cost of having an undesirable catch profile (further relevant 
details on this issue were covered previously in STECF (2008)). Such an approach could utilise 
existing protocols and procedures currently used in control activities. For example, there are protocols 
associated with, i) legal minimum landing sizes to measure lengths; ii) the numbers of fish caught per 
unit time of towing (as used in the North Sea real time closures UK) and iii) the percentage of the total 
number of fish of a species that are under a reference sizes. 
A switch to a RBM approach does present a number of challenges. The effectiveness of the approach 
is dependent on a high level of confidence. At sea monitoring will be required to ensure compliance. 
However, the compliance issue will affect vessels subject to different control regimes differently. 
Vessels subject to full documentation will be easier to control (and penalise) than vessels in the 
traditional control regime. There is a strong reliance at the individual level to incorporate technical 
measures voluntarily and that they use their knowledge to ensure compliance. There is a requirement 
for minimum standards to avoid so called “free-riders” undermining the efforts by innovative 
individuals. Vessel owners’ decisions on whether to change practices and if so, how much money it is 
worth spending, depend, in the absence of any positive incentive to change, on how likely they believe 
it there will be a negative consequence of not changing and how severe such a consequence would if 
they did change. 
 
EWG-13-01 considers that the degree of faith in terms of monitoring and control will need to be 
considered when deciding whether there is a need for continued detailed technical measures. If a vessel 
owner believes that the sanction for failing to achieve the target levels is likely to be more costly than 
adopting measures to reduce unwanted catches, then, assuming the owner still expects to be profitable 
despite the additional cost, he will next consider how likely it is that his business will incur sanctions. 
If the sanctions are applied at fishery level, with no causal link to individual vessels, then each vessel 
owner must second-guess the actions of the other skippers in the fishery, some of whom are from 
different countries, in order to assess the probability that the fishery as a whole will achieve or miss the 
targets. This becomes essentially a prisoners’ dilemma situation. If a skipper chooses to adopt costly 
discard reduction practices, but not enough other skippers in the fleet do so and sanctions are applied, 
then the skipper who experienced the costs of compliance would also experience the costs of sanctions, 
whereas those who did not invest in discard reduction would suffer only the costs of sanctions. So the 
skipper who changes practices is penalised relative to those who did not improve their discard levels. 
Vessel owners may choose to reduce discards and hope to influence others to change practice such that 
the fishery overall achieves the discard level targets. Alternatively, they may expect that it is unlikely 
that others will change practices and will decide to accept the costs of the sanction only, rather than the 
costs of changing practices and the costs of sanctions as well. Therefore, if a sanction is to be effective, 
it must not only be more costly than changing practice to achieve the target, it must also apply 
specifically to vessels which do not achieve the discard targets, rather than equally to all vessels, 
whether or not they achieve the target.  
Therefore, can the benefits of an RBM approach be retained in the absence of hard sanctions? There 
are currently catch-based results measures in place that are linked with real time closure systems. 
These were considered to incorporate a softer sanction whereby it is not vessel specific and requires all 
relevant vessels to cease fishing in a defined area for a defined period. This type of sanction system is 
likely to be better suited to a Catch-RBM and would reduce the level of incentive for non-compliance 
with a discard ban policy. An important benefit of the approach is in generating data that can be used 
to evaluate whether management objectives are being met. This data can be easily interpreted by 
fishers, managers and scientists alike. It could also be used to identify groups of vessels that require 
support in shifting their catch profiles. Another soft sanction could be mandatory requirement to 
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participate in studies to improve selectivity with the target catch profile as the objective of the work. 
The move to a discard ban policy will require a fundamental shift in how fisheries are monitored, from 
a situation whereby fishing vessels are restricted in what can be retained onboard to one where they 
will be restricted in what can be discarded. This change will require new methods and approaches and 
will almost certainly include at-sea inspections. During at-sea inspections, assessing the catch profile 
from a haul/set and comparing it with the retained catches onboard will give an indication of 
compliance with the obligation to land all catches. Therefore, measurements that would be required to 
control a Catch-RBM approach would also be required to monitor compliance with a discard ban 
policy. In many instances the current measures are in contradiction with the proposed discard ban (e.g. 
minimum landings sizes, catch composition regulations), therefore if a Catch-RBM approach were 
developed and adopted it would avoid the requirement to reconstruct the current technical measures. 
 
2.1.7. Industry considerations and responsibility 
The Catch-RBM approach does have genuine benefits, for example it bridges the gap between catches 
on the deck with management targets for the stock and by doing so it is easy for stakeholders to see the 
aims of the measures. It also facilitates more flexibility to the fishermen in how they match their 
fishing operations with their quota allocations, and consequently reduces the need for prescriptive 
gear-based technical measures. A results-based approach of this type would mean fishermen would 
have the freedom to develop vessel specific technical solutions, which would not have to add further to 
the existing complex list of technical regulations. 
Focusing on the composition or structure of catches is likely to increase the level in understanding of 
the regulation and its purpose by fishermen relative to current technical measures which can suffer 
from perverse incentives which lead to responses that are at odds with management objectives. EWG-
12-14 noted that the current paternalistic approach incentivises innovation towards mitigating the 
potential or perceived impacts of technical measures. Under an RBM approach, where technical 
constraints are minimised or removed, fishermen would be encouraged to innovate and would have 
much higher flexibility in how they could alter the design of the fishing gear or modify their fishing 
strategies to achieve the desired catch profiles.  
Assuming that control and enforcement problems can be solved then there would be a limited, if any, 
need for prescriptive regulations. The responsibility for introduction of measures would lie with the 
fishermen themselves. There may be different solutions to achieve a target. In many cases fishermen 
may have enough experience to be able to introduce the right measures. However, in cases it will be 
impossible for fishermen to assess the effects of the introduction of a certain measure. Therefore, there 
must be cooperation between scientists and the fishermen to find common solutions. It will also be 
helpful to perform a thorough impact assessment for certain measures at the beginning of a change to a 
RBM system to give managers and fishermen a better picture on the possible outcome.  
A move towards a RBM approach, by default raises broader issues beyond simply technical 
regulations. The success of a RBM approach is also dependent on social (responsibility, management, 
tradition/ historical) and economic (labour, income) factors. This places onus on the industry to 
minimise unwanted catches i.e. focus on what they can sell and in some regards this means that the 
sector themselves become responsible for sustainable fisheries. However, before implementing a RBM 
it is important to consider that awareness, sense of accountability/responsibility and the common 
understanding of the fishery sector are important concepts that must be addressed. It must also be clear 
beforehand which results are expected, what are the time lines, what the biological and economic 
benefits are Implementation of an RBM approach needs to consider how individual fishermen are 
involved and what types of information are required to assist the transit from the current prescriptive 
approach.   
The sector consists of numerous family-owned, rather small individual companies. Fishermen 
themselves generally seem not always very well informed and involved with policymaking issues. 
  28    
They feel that others are responsible for solving problems about fish stocks and management of stocks 
and they refer to representatives of fishermen’s interest who are now somehow involved with the 
process of making suggestions for necessary measures. Implementation of measures, will not say that 
the fishery sector will adopt them. The social process of acceptance is a very important and 
underestimated issue. A suggestion is to inform and organise fishermen that way that they become 
more involved with thinking about necessary measures to be taken so that they become more 
responsible for these measures too. It is important from a business perspective that any potential 
benefits from a stock perspective are also translated in economic terms e.g. potential increase in future 
revenue maybe helpful to inform fishermen. How ‘significant’ or tangible this may be at an individual 
level will be dependent on access rights within the fishery. However, this is closely linked to the 
concepts discussed in section 2.2.1, where the benefits of changes in exploitation pattern through 
tactical or technical adaptations (the means resting with the industry) would be seen as an important 
part of the process.  There are now regular impact assessments required for the introduction of any new 
policy on EU level. Therefore, it can be part of the general implementation process of a new RBM plan 
to assess socio-economic impacts (short, mid and long-term trade-offs). This can be done also by 
comparing the effects of different measures possibly introduced by the fishing sector to achieve the 
targets. The results would then illustrate what may be the most cost effective way for the fishing sector 
to do that (see section 2.1.1 for a methodological explanation). It would create positive incentives for 
the fishing sector if the results show that in the mid to long run revenues increase.  
 
2.1.8. Hybrid approaches  
The above sections discuss the merits, considerations and disadvantages when shifting from a 
prescriptive to a result based approach. However, in practice these concepts do not have to be mutually 
exclusive and it is possible to have hybrid approaches. Lassen et al, 2008, identified a hierarchy of 
objectives and the appropriateness of the reversal of the burden of proof. High level principals, 
objectives and standards are the responsibility of governing bodies such as the EU or Regional 
Management Organisations. In the context of a more regional approach to the CFP where regional 
authorities and member states together with the industry have responsibility to achieve the overarching 
objectives, such bodies may choose to deploy prescriptive measures to attain specific goals or results.  
Here we present an example of how prescriptive technical measures can support an overarching 
objective (the reduction of cod fishing mortality). There are often concerns that the framework within 
which these measures operate can be bureaucratic and slow; however, this does not necessarily have to 
be the case, particularly in the context of regionalisation where the regional authorities may have the 
ability to introduce such measures in an administrative rather than regulatory way. We demonstrate 
how metrics of output, even if they can be calculated at sufficiently high resolution, may be difficult to 
interpret. We also discuss the implementation of these measures and how fishermen's’ support will 
depend on the flexibility of the scheme and ultimately the economic viability of their businesses. 
The cod plan provides a provision for Member States to employ alternative measures as long as they 
delivered equivalent fishing mortality reductions to those specified in the management plan for cod 
stocks. In Scotland the Conservation Credits Scheme, an initiative involving industry, NGOs, scientists 
and government official, provides the framework for delivering a management process to achieve these 
targets. The national authorities committed to specified reductions in cod catches (overarching 
objective) allowing the industry, in cooperation with scientists, to develop the specific instruments to 
achieve the reductions. Two specific fisheries are considered, the gadoid fishery (TR1) and the 
Nephrops fishery (TR2). 
This scheme is a combination of input and output controls. 
Input controls 
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Demersal vessels targeting mixed demersal species (TR1) are granted a baseline number of days 
fishing for using the standard gear which in the Scottish demersal whitefish fishery (TR1 vessels) is a 
single or twin trawl with forward sections made of 120 – 160mm netting and with 120mm mesh size 
codends and extension sections. The gear options available include increasing codend mesh size, 
fitting a square mesh panel in the extension section, fitting large mesh size belly panels (behind the 
footrope) and increasing the mesh size of the whole of the forward section (the belly panel and all 
netting above and forward of it). These gears are categorised according to how selective they are for 
cod and their use is incentivized by offering additional days fishing according to which category they 
are in. The gear details, their category and the associated additional fishing days are detailed in Table 
2.1.8. 
TR2 vessels fishing in the Farne Deeps and the Fladen Grounds are obliged to use ‘highly selective 
gears’ which reduce the capture of cod by 60% in comparison to the standard prawn trawl fishing an 
80mm codend with a 120mm SMP at 15 – 18m from the codline, with  60% target chosen by the 
administration. At present two gears have been developed by the Scottish fishing industry, the Flip–
Flap trawl and the Faithlie Cod Avoidance Panel (FCAP) and have been accepted by STECF (PLEN 
12-04) as fulfilling these requirements. 
To implement these measures there was a need to define the specifications of the various gear options. 
The intention from the start was to try and keep these specifications as simple as possible yet provide 
enough detail so that the gears could be rigged and fished as intended. The design specifications are 
then detailed in the national conservation plan. 
The design features of the TR1 gears (the Orkney/Shetland cod avoidance trawl) are very straightforward 
and simple definition which essentially specifies the mesh size and dimensions of the forward panels. 
To date these definitions have proved adequate in describing the gear for both operational and 
enforcement purposes, which may be attributable to the simplicity of the design modification and the 
robustness of the measure (insofar as small ‘tweaking’ is unlikely to significantly alter the selection 
characteristics) 
The TR2 ‘highly selective gears’ (FCAP) design features are more complicated, however. For these 
gears there was a greater need for detail due to the design changes being more innovative and the 
designs being less robust (small deviations from the design could lead to large changes of selectivity). 
The definitions of the TR2 gears also underwent a certain number of iterations as clarification was 
sought from either the fishing industry or the enforcement agency with regard to issues such as weak 
links, twine thickness, flotation, positioning of escape holes etc (the elements that had to be modified 
are in italics in the definition).Although this iterative process had the potential to be onerous and time 
consuming, it was not. Once the modified definition was agreed by the fishing industry and Marine 
Scotland, all that was required was an update and a reissue of the scheme rules. While the national cod 
management scheme has some degree of administrative and scientific burden, the process of 
introducing and adapting the gears permissible and the incentive structure used for the TR1 gears, is 
relatively straightforward and critically there is no complex legislative process. It could be envisaged 
that this would describe the approach that may be taken under regional based management plans.  
Output controls 
While the approach presented, demonstrates how national or regional plans can provide a great deal of 
flexibility in terms of how the industry can respond to specific targets, a related issue is how to 
demonstrate the efficacy of these types of measures. This is particularly difficult in this case where 
there are a number of different fleet segments, a number of gear options and the measures are part of a 
package which also includes the use of temporal and spatial closures. STECF (PLEN 11-04) noted that 
it is very difficult to disentangle the impact of multiple measures and that appropriate metrics that are 
sympathetic to the types of measures introduced are required. STECF (PLEN 10-02) noted that a 
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comparison of catches pre and post introduction and a comparison of catch profiles associated with 
vessels within and outside the scheme would be useful. In the case of the TR2 example presented here, 
the latter option is not relevant as businesses are obliged to use the gear. Trends in CPUE could be 
considered as a metric of the fleet response. Figure 2.1.8.1 presents the cod cpue (kg per hour) on 
observed vessels in the Scottish TR1 fleet between 2008 and 2011. Although the observations are 
limited and cannot be treated as controlled comparisons, they are instructive as they highlight some of 
the difficulties associated with interpreting some of the output metrics. The results are counterintuitive 
and suggest that vessels that do not adapt any selective gears are in fact the most selective and equally 
that the 130 mm codend  is more selective than the Orkney Gear, which is not backed up by results 
from supporting scientific trials.  
The interpretation of this is difficult. It may reflect that those taking up the different options are vessels 
that already target cod leaving only those that primarily target other species in these categories. This 
may be particularly the case for the FDF boats which are generally acknowledged as being some of the 
main cod catching boats. Another possibility is that these vessels are transferring quota to other groups 
e.g. the FDF ones but then succeeding in avoiding cod so that their own catch rate declines. 
These results also need to be seen in the light of the prevailing SSB (Fig. 2.1.8.2). The total cpue value 
for these data remains more or less constant suggesting that overall these measures have not been 
effective. Over the same time period, however, there has been an increase of SSB by about 40% 
indicating the converse and suggesting that indeed the selective gears have achieved their objective at 
least partially. 
Fishermen’s Understanding 
Fishermen operating within the scheme are generally supportive of the developments; the reward of 
additional days at sea in return for reducing cod mortality in ways other than applying the effort-brake 
is seen as a positive move. There are economic negatives however that counter-balance and even 
outweigh the additional opportunity provided, especially for those that spend the least time at sea and 
benefit least of all from the additional effort provided. The loss of species such as anglerfish and 
megrim that flows from using the Flip-flap and FCAP often undermines the economic viability of the 
fishing business.  
Many fishermen are also critical of the one size fits all approach, which assumes that every vessel is 
desperate for more days at sea and is willing to compromise efficiency to achieve it, when in reality a 
significant proportion of TR2 vessels were neither in need of more days at sea nor were they catching 
many cod, it is a negative sum game for these vessels because for this fleet segment (TR2), the use of 
the more selective gear was obligatory.  
Nonetheless this system of input and output controls can be looked at a model for a regionalised 
approach and certainly has merits over the current EU top-down approach to technical measures. It has 
geared innovation in the right way and has instilled some sense of ownership on the fishermen 
involved in the fisheries. 
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Figure 2.1.8.1. Cod cpue (kg per hour) on observed vessels in the Scottish TR1 fleet between 2008 and 2011 
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Figure 2.1.8.2 Trend in CPUE compared to increasing trend in SSB 
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Table 2.1.1.8 TR1 gear classifications and additional days at sea allocations. 
  Allocations 
Classification Gears Flat rate 
(days) 
Track record 
Level 1 gear • “130mm cod end” +15 +8% 
Level 2 gear • “300mm belly mesh” +30 +19% 
Level 3 gear • “Orkney trawl” • “Shetland trawl” 
• “200mm SMP” 
• “600mm belly mesh” 
+50 +29% 
Level 4 gear • “Eliminator trawl” • “800mm belly mesh” +70 +44% 
 
 
 
3 CONCLUSIONS 
 
• A move to a more regionalised management approach,  incorporating mixed-fisheries 
management plans and an obligation to land all catches,  will likely result in the need for the 
quantitative evaluation and role of technical measures (gear/spatial/temporal) in meeting 
mixed-fisheries obligations and minimizing TAC undershoots.  
• Adjustments in exploitation pattern can result in changes in the MSY yield of a given stock 
through changes in Fmsy point estimates.  Incorporating the effect of changing exploitation 
pattern in within regional management plans via harvest control rules may provide a 
transparent view on the potential impact that varying EP can have on fishing opportunities, 
thereby providing tangible incentives for adjusting selectivity. However, in the absence of 
catch based fishing opportunities, there will be little incentive in such an approach. 
• Where different demographic groups (e.g. juveniles and adults) of a stock are targeted by 
different metiers, the full potential of managing exploitation pattern may not be realised and 
preference to regulating exploitation rate should be the norm.  
• Highlighting the potential of changes in EP together with other management levers (e.g. TACs) 
in a structured requires further analysis and simulation. Consideration should be given to a 
much deeper iteration of this analysis based on different species and fisheries to establish the 
real effects and potential impacts.  
• It could be expected that in fully documented fisheries, business are encouraged to minimise 
catches of length classes which have a lower price. Provided that the desired economic 
exploitation pattern is consistent with the optimum biological exploitation pattern, then it may 
not be necessary to specify the technical characteristics of the gears deployed. However, where 
there are broader ecosystem issues requiring protection through technical measures prescriptive 
measures will continue to be required.  
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• Similarly, the introduction of discard ban, where catches of unwanted or unmarketable fish are 
discounted from a vessels quota allocation, will provide an incentive to introduce technical and 
tactical responses to limit catches of with no market value. In principle at least, this should 
limit the need for technical measures towards broader ecosystem objectives.  
• De-regulating the need for specific technical measures will, in principal, remove the need for 
specifying minimum mesh sizes. As mesh size bands are currently used to define ‘fleet’ 
management units e.g. Cod plan, and sampling units e.g. DCF level 6, alternative metrics 
would be required for these definitions if required. 
• The degree of faith in overall compliance of a discard ban is crucial. If the level of monitoring 
and control is considered insufficient, then prescriptive based technical measures will continue 
to be required. Failure to introduce adequate safety into the system when there are concerns 
about the degree of control could potentially have significant and negative consequences. As 
such there will be a continued requirement for minimum standards to avoid so called “free-
riders” undermining the efforts by innovative and compliant individuals. 
• Results based approaches or approaches where there are clearly defined objectives such as 
prescribed reductions in fishing mortality or catch rates, can provide appropriate and clear 
targets. In the context of regional or national management plans, there is evidence to date that 
shows that such an approach has achieved positive directional change.     
• In principle, catch based indicators as a ‘result-metrics’ could be seen as an alternative to 
prescriptive technical specifications of fishing gears. This has the advantage of providing a 
closer link to the objective in terms of attaining a specific catch profile rather than using the 
technical characteristics of the gear as a proxy. The proposed Conservation Reference Size 
could be used as such and indicator provided that the reference sizes are linked to the objective 
of obtaining a specific catch profile. A catch based approach is also dependent on the escape 
survival of individual species and age groups and where modifications proposed result in 
elevated escape mortality, the perceived sustainability objectives may not be met. 
• Implementation of this system might lead to an incentive towards non compliance with the 
objectives of the discard ban. A limit on catch percentage of small (or undesirable) fish may 
result in unintended negative consequences that counteract the intentions behind the discard 
ban. 
• The choice of indicators is important as catch based parameters are not only influenced by the 
choice of selectivity measure and tactic, but also on the underlying population structure making 
it difficult to disentangle the technical/tactical effects from changes in the population. This can 
result in unstable indicators and indicators that are not solely responsive to the technical/tactical 
changes by individual businesses. Choice of indicator is likely to be fishery and regionally 
specific and are likely to require continued revaluation.  
• Catch based indicators provide guidance on the exploitation pattern at an individual business 
level and if minimum standards are maintained/required, catch based indicators can be used to 
encourage improvements in selection patterns as it provides a readily understood and obvious 
relationship between the overarching objective and the catch. Such catch based indicators are 
already used in the North Sea as a means of and are used as the basis of soft sanctions e.g. 
enacting area closures or moving on procedures.  
• Setting minimum selectivity standards may pose an alternative approach to the use of pure 
catch based metrics. However, this would require ongoing scientific evaluation of gears 
proposed by industry to meet the targets and would likely result in defining a list of permissible 
gears due to control and enforcement concerns.  
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• In terms of broader ecosystem objectives, it is likely that there will be an ongoing requirement 
for prescriptive measures to ensure that broader ecosystem objectives e.g. minimisation of 
benthic impact are achieved. It is noted that even under a results based approach focussed on 
achieving specific exploitation patterns, it is likely that the technical and operational tactics 
deployed are also likely to result in reductions in unwanted ecosystem impacts e.g. reduction in 
the catches of unwanted fish for example.  
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